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Re: [eduGAIN-discuss] Post-Quantum readiness and crypto-agility for federation aggregates


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  • From: Muhammad Farhan SJAUGI <farhan AT sifulan.my>
  • To: "edugain-discuss AT lists.geant.org" <edugain-discuss AT lists.geant.org>, Stefan Winter <stefan.winter AT restena.lu>
  • Subject: Re: [eduGAIN-discuss] Post-Quantum readiness and crypto-agility for federation aggregates
  • Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 13:40:24 +0000
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Hi Stefan,

Thank you for the information. I am wondering, how is the support from the IdP/SP software? Does shibboleth IdP and SP support PQC and ECDSA algorithms?

Regards

From: edugain-discuss-request AT lists.geant.org <edugain-discuss-request AT lists.geant.org> on behalf of Stefan Winter <edugain-discuss AT lists.geant.org>
Sent: Tuesday, 3 November, 2026 19:00
To: edugain-discuss AT lists.geant.org <edugain-discuss AT lists.geant.org>
Subject: [eduGAIN-discuss] Post-Quantum readiness and crypto-agility for federation aggregates
 
Hello!


A recent discussion on federation metadata signature requirements
(require larger RSA keys soon) got me thinking about whether RSA still
has enough of a future ahead that it is worth "just" increasing key
sizes for federations that are below the cut.

Current recommendations regarding post-quantum readiness rather suggest
to move away from RSA entirely.

Unfortunately, it is less clear where to move *to* instead. ECDSA is on
the same way out that RSA is. PQC algorithms exist but they are
relatively new and it is not unthinkable that one or some will not stand
the test of time.


In these uncertain times, eduID Luxembourg is taking a step towards PQC,
while adding "crypto-agility" where there was none before.


 From now on, we are publishing our federation aggregate with four
distinct signature algorithms: RSA/4096 bit, ECDSA/NIST P-521 curve,
ML-DSA/87 and SLH-DSA/256s. You can find our aggregates here:
https://restena.lu/en/document/354-implement-eduid-metadata


This is maybe not crypto-agile in a classic reading - every signature
stands on its own, with no relation to the others. But:

* as new algorithms become customary, we can simply enlarge the list;

* if an algorithm falls from cryptographers' grace, it can simply be
removed;

* all variants have identical content except for the <ds:Signature>
element. In case any subset of algorithms is /actually/ compromised and
used to sign bogus federation metadata, this becomes detectable by
comparing all four aggregate files and observing that there is a
difference in the payload.


To my knowledge, eduGAIN OT is already working on the ability to
validate all signature variants; if they were to add a four-way
comparison of all the file contents, we could consider this a full
PQC-ready crypto-agile setup.


Happy to hear your thoughts on this.


Greetings,


Stefan Winter




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