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[eduGAIN-discuss] Post-Quantum readiness and crypto-agility for federation aggregates


Chronological Thread 
  • From: Stefan Winter <stefan.winter AT restena.lu>
  • To: edugain-discuss AT lists.geant.org
  • Subject: [eduGAIN-discuss] Post-Quantum readiness and crypto-agility for federation aggregates
  • Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2026 12:00:13 +0100
  • Authentication-results: mail.geant.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=restena.lu header.i= AT restena.lu header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20240131 header.b=IUCnvSbY; dkim-atps=neutral

Hello!


A recent discussion on federation metadata signature requirements (require larger RSA keys soon) got me thinking about whether RSA still has enough of a future ahead that it is worth "just" increasing key sizes for federations that are below the cut.

Current recommendations regarding post-quantum readiness rather suggest to move away from RSA entirely.

Unfortunately, it is less clear where to move *to* instead. ECDSA is on the same way out that RSA is. PQC algorithms exist but they are relatively new and it is not unthinkable that one or some will not stand the test of time.


In these uncertain times, eduID Luxembourg is taking a step towards PQC, while adding "crypto-agility" where there was none before.


From now on, we are publishing our federation aggregate with four distinct signature algorithms: RSA/4096 bit, ECDSA/NIST P-521 curve, ML-DSA/87 and SLH-DSA/256s. You can find our aggregates here: https://restena.lu/en/document/354-implement-eduid-metadata


This is maybe not crypto-agile in a classic reading - every signature stands on its own, with no relation to the others. But:

* as new algorithms become customary, we can simply enlarge the list;

* if an algorithm falls from cryptographers' grace, it can simply be removed;

* all variants have identical content except for the <ds:Signature> element. In case any subset of algorithms is /actually/ compromised and used to sign bogus federation metadata, this becomes detectable by comparing all four aggregate files and observing that there is a difference in the payload.


To my knowledge, eduGAIN OT is already working on the ability to validate all signature variants; if they were to add a four-way comparison of all the file contents, we could consider this a full PQC-ready crypto-agile setup.


Happy to hear your thoughts on this.


Greetings,


Stefan Winter




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